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Abstract  
A market anomaly (or market inefficiency) is a price distortion typically on a financial market that 
seems to contradict the efficient-market hypothesis. Such anomalies could be calendar, technical or 
fundamental related and have been shown empirically in a number of settings for financial markets. 
This paper extends this stream of research to two-sided auction platforms in Electronic Commerce 
and empirically analyzes whether calendar anomalies are persistent on such markets. Our empirical 
study analyzes 78,068 transactions completed between buyers and sellers on a German auction 
platform and covers the period between April 2005 and May 2009. We observe a persistent turn-of-
the-month effect and a day-of-the-week effect that would allow buyers to realize small additional 
surpluses (0.3% price discount). Prices are also persistently lower in the highly competitive Christmas 
trade period while sellers benefit from higher prices at the beginning of every year. Overall our 
results support the common notion that two-sided auction platforms are rather efficient markets on 
which we however can observe some marginal market inefficiencies.  
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1 Introduction 
One of the key economic processes when a buyer and a seller engage in trading is that of price 
discovery, i.e. finding a price that both market sides accept. Due to the characteristics of the Internet, 
this process has undergone drastic changes over the past few years. Lower menu costs, the reduction 
of processing costs associated with price differentiation, and new possibilities to interact with 
prospective trading partners online have led to a number of platforms that employ auction-type 
mechanisms for price discovery (Bapna et al., 2004; Hinz and Spann, 2008; Hinz et al., 2011). 
These new platforms share some important properties with financial stock markets but are compared 
to financial markets still under-researched. In finance, the efficient-market hypothesis asserts that 
financial markets are “informationally efficient”. This means that investors cannot consistently 
achieve higher returns than the average market for a particular risk-class, given that the information is 
publicly available at the time of the investment (Fama, 1970). However, it has been shown empirically 
that this hypothesis does not hold for markets like stock exchanges and market anomalies occur (e.g. 
Ariel, 1990). A market anomaly (or market inefficiency) is a price distortion on a financial market that 
seems to contradict the efficient-market hypothesis. Such anomalies could be calendar, technical or 
fundamental related.  
Stock exchanges and auction markets in Electronic Commerce have in common that a market 
mechanism brings together two market sides, namely buyers and sellers. This could be double auctions 
or English auctions or any type of auction where prices reflect the relationship between demand and 
supply. In an efficient market neither buyers nor sellers would be able to systematically gain higher 
surpluses than market averages for a longer time. If prices are lower for example on Mondays, supply 
would drop (i.e. sellers are not willing to sell their products/share on this day of the week and offer it 
on another day of the week) while demand would raise at the same time (i.e. buyers would try to buy 
on Mondays and thus competition amongst buyers would raise the price) until this distortion is 
nullified. Thus, if price distortions occur, market forces are expected to correct this distortion so that 
they cannot persist for a longer time or occur regularly. 
If price distortions persist for a longer time, this would allow well-informed sellers and buyers to 
optimize their market entry and offering/bidding strategy. The intermediary would then have to 
reconsider his market design and could introduce tools that attenuate information asymmetries to 
increase the market efficiency.  
The aim of our paper is therefore to analyze a long time series of data of a two-sided auction platform 
with respect to market anomalies. We analyze 78,066 transactions in 211 weeks and check whether 
systematic price and sales distortions occur for products sold on a two-sided auction platform.  
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows: In the following chapter we will outline the previous 
research and will focus on research on two-sided markets and introduce the efficient-market 
hypothesis. We will further outline the empirical research on market anomalies. Chapter two will also 
outline that there are only few studies that examine two-sided auction markets with respect to market 
anomalies and thereby emphasizes the gap in literature which we will close with our empirical study 
which is introduced in chapter 3. We start with describing the platform and its business model before 
we report some descriptives of the analyzed data. At the core of this chapter we will analyze whether 
market anomalies can be found at this platform. We discuss the results in chapter 4, outline the 
limitations of our approach and describe opportunities for future research before we conclude the 
paper with final remarks. 
  
2 Previous Research 
2.1 Two-Sided Markets 
A two-sided electronic market is defined as an interorganizational information system through which 
two customer populations, buyers and sellers, interact to accomplish market-making activities. It helps 
these customer populations to identify potential trading partners, selecting a specific trading partner 
and executing the transactions (Choudhury et al., 1998). 
In two-sided markets, an intermediary provides the platform for linking together two distinct customer 
populations (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). For instance, the auction platform eBay provides the 
infrastructure as well as the rules and processes to enable transactions between two customer 
populations: On one side of the market eBay serves sellers with a platform to offer their products, on 
the other side eBay provides buyers an opportunity to purchase products. Two-sided markets have 
become more prevalent in the Network Economy (Shapiro and Varian, 1998) and can be found in 
many industries (Eisenmann et al., 2006). The Internet has created new industries such as online 
auction houses and digital marketplaces (Ellison and Ellison, 2005), where intermediaries provide a 
platform that brings together buyers and sellers or, generally speaking, demand and supply. In 2011, 
eBay reported to make 60 billion EUR in gross merchandise volume via its E-Commerce platforms 
(eBay, 2012). 
In two-sided markets, both customer populations – in case of eBay buyers and sellers interacting on 
the platform – are crucial to the intermediary. The existence of many sellers offering products on eBay 
attracts more buyers to the platform. Vice versa, many buyers in turn attract more sellers (Tucker and 
Zhang, 2010). Thus, network effects are present in two-sided markets. Network effects or network 
externalities are defined as a change in the surplus that a consumer derives from a good or service 
when the number of consumers or the demand changes (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1994). 
The rise and fall of several auction and shopping market places has demonstrated the strength of 
networks effects in this business. Shapiro and Varian (1998) indicate that strong network externalities 
may lead to a “winner-takes-it-all-market” where one company offers the dominant market place. 
Moreover, much effort has to be put into the recruitment of new sellers and buyers. On platforms the 
demand on one side would tend to vanish if there was no demand on the other. Evans (2003) gives a 
good overview on solutions existing for this “chicken-and-egg” problem. The literature on competition 
in two-sided platforms, especially in microeconomics, is growing rapidly, see amongst others Caillaud 
and Jullien (2001), Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Rysman (2004). 
Market places in the Internet have already reached a mature stage. Late followers can face enormous 
competitive disadvantages, requiring more marketing to overcome the barriers-of-entry erected by 
earlier companies with regard to consumer preference and awareness (Kerin et al., 1992). Especially in 
the Internet late followers suffer from these disadvantages. Particularly the number of electronic 
market places seems to be limited. Early entrants do have significant advantages and gain large market 
shares (Hidding and Williams, 2003).  
However, these electronic markets increase economic efficiency and offer a high transparency and low 
search costs for market participants (Bakos, 1998) and thus fulfil better the conditions for perfect 
markets than traditional offline markets. Among these conditions are perfect market information, no 
participant with market power to dictate prices, and no barriers for participants to enter or exit the 
markets. 
 
  
2.2 Efficient Markets and Market Anomalies 
The efficient-market hypothesis requires that market participants maximize their utility and have 
rational expectations. Further, it requires that on average the market participants are correct. This 
could also mean that no market participant is correct, but on average the behaviour of all market 
participants evens out. Additionally the market hypothesis requires that market participants update 
their beliefs whenever new relevant information becomes available. The market participants do not 
need to be rational but their behaviour follows a normal distribution. So some market participants 
might bid too high or too early and some might bid too low or too late.  
This yields market prices that cannot be exploited with certainty to realize abnormal surpluses, 
especially when considering transaction and search costs. In such markets, no market participant is 
better than the rest in the long run and no market participant has to be right about the market. 
There are three common forms of the efficient-market hypothesis: the weak-form efficiency, the semi-
strong-form efficiency, and the strong-form efficiency. Each has different implications for how 
markets work. 
The weak-form efficiency says that future prices cannot be forecasted by analyzing data from the past. 
Market participants cannot sustainably realize abnormal surpluses even with access to the entire data 
of past prices since there are no patterns of price fluctuations that can be exploited with investment 
strategies. This means that prices follow a random walk, but many studies have shown empirically that 
markets follow trends for some time. This trend vanishes with time but may provide excess returns for 
a short period. 
The semi-strong-form efficiency implies that prices incorporate publicly available new information 
instantly and in an unbiased fashion, such that market participants cannot realize abnormal surpluses 
by trading on that information. The semi-strong-form efficiency also implies that neither fundamental 
analysis (since all information available is always priced in) nor technical analysis (since prices follow 
a random walk) can help to generate abnormal surpluses in the long run. Prices will adapt to new 
information if the news were previously unknown and relevant. Such news lead to steep upward or 
downward changes in prices. 
The strong-form efficiency implies that prices always reflect all public and private available 
information and no market participant can generate abnormal surpluses when insider trades are 
prohibited by law. If the strong-form efficiency is assumed then no fund manager is able to “beat the 
market” in the long run. Successful fund managers that were able to generate excess returns have thus 
just been lucky. 
We expect that two-sided auction markets would at least be efficient in the weak-form. For used 
products, the seller has information advantages which lead to information asymmetries (see Akerlof, 
1970). For boxed, unused products all information is available to all market participants such that even 
a stronger form could be assumed. On efficient markets (in all forms) market anomalies should not 
occur according to theory. A market anomaly (or market inefficiency) is a price distortion on a 
financial market that seems to contradict the efficient-market hypothesis. Such anomalies could be 
calendar, technical or fundamental related and have been shown empirically in a number of settings 
for financial markets. 
One prominent example for a calendar anomaly is the Monday effect which manifests in the belief that 
securities market returns on Mondays are on average less than other days of the week, and are often 
negative on average. The Monday effect, which is also known as Day-of-the-week effect or weekend 
effect, has been observed in both American and foreign exchanges (e.g. Fields, 1931, Jaffe and 
Westerfield, 1985). Ariel (1987) and Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) observed the tendency of stock 
prices to increase during the last two days and the first three days of each month. This effect, which is 
called Turn-of-the-Month effect, is most likely based on the timing of monthly cash flows of pension 
funds that invest in turn at this time of the month in the stock market. Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) 
  
also observed another calendar related market anomaly which they called holiday effect. Their 
empirical study revealed that investors can generate abnormal returns before an exchange-mandated 
long weekend or holiday such as Labor Day or Christmas. 
Fundamental related anomalies are e.g. the small-cap effect (e.g. Roll, 1981), which describes the 
tendency that small-capitalization stocks outperform the market or the value effect (e.g. Fama and 
French, 1998), which refers to the positive relation between security returns and the ratio of 
accounting based measures of cash flow or value to the market price of the security. These 
fundamental related and technical related anomalies, like the momentum effect (see Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993), exist exclusively in financial markets and are therefore out of the scope of this paper 
while calendar anomalies can in principle also exist on other markets like two-sided auction markets. 
Yet, only few studies examine market anomalies in two-sided markets in Electronic Commerce. 
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) showed for example that the price dispersion for the same product on 
electronic markets is still substantial and thus the rule of a single market price is invalid. Ba and 
Pavlou (2002) revealed that reputation has a significant influence on prices in electronic markets (see 
Dellarocas 2003 for another overview). This finding is still in line with the efficient-market 
hypothesis, since a more reliable trading partner can lower the risk of being cheated by the trading 
partner.   
On perfect markets demand should follow supply and vice versa. If demand is higher on certain days 
on auction platforms like eBay, prospective sellers would shift their offers to these days since they 
would expect higher prices and supply would rise equally. It would thus not be possible to make 
additional profits for sellers or achieve lower prices for buyers on particular weekdays or months for a 
longer period of time. However, first empirical evidence suggests that two-sided platforms suffer from 
persistent market anomalies that substantially influence sales and prices. 
Simonsohn (2010) e.g. shows that a disproportionate share of auctions end during peak bidding hours 
and such hours exhibit lower selling rates and prices. Moreover, Simonsohn (2010) also finds that 
peak listing is more prevalent among sellers likely to have chosen ending time strategically, 
suggesting disproportionate entry is a mistake driven by bounded rationality rather than mindlessness. 
This paper picks up the topic and continues to empirically examine market anomalies in two-sided 
electronic markets, i.e. auction platforms in particular, and focuses on calendar anomalies. 
3 Empirical Study 
For the purpose of our study, we acquired data from a German auction platform on a daily basis and 
analyze the sales, price, and revenues of the top-selling products over time. We label this intermediary 
“Platform.com”, since we do not disclose the name for reasons of maintaining confidentiality. 
3.1 Platform Description 
On Platform.com, sellers offer their products – such as consumer electronics, household appliances, 
jewellery, watches and cosmetics – to buyers. The sellers are exclusively professional retailers (in 
contrast to eBay) who sell to private individuals. Only brand-new, boxed products can be sold on 
Platform.com. The European article number (EAN) is used to identify the products unambiguously. 
The intermediary is a start-up company funded in three rounds, and investors include the High-Tech 
Entrepreneur Fund of the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. Platform.com 
charges sellers per transaction, while buyers can use the platform for free. Sellers pay 3% fee on the 
volume per transaction while the intermediary does not charge buyers. One market side thus 
subsidizes the customer population on the other market side which is a common feature in the network 
economy and two-sided markets. The relationship between the intermediary and its customer 
populations, buyers and sellers, is non-contractual.  
  
Prices include shipping costs and the intermediary offers a trusted service and takes responsibility for 
the sellers’ action on the platform such that buyers cannot suffer from auction fraud. Therefore, the 
intermediary chooses the sellers quite carefully since the intermediary has to cover potential losses due 
to sellers’ fraudulent actions. 
The intermediary applies a continuous double auction to find prices which makes the platform thus 
comparable to common stock exchanges. In continuous double auctions multiple buyers and multiple 
sellers can simultaneously and continuously negotiate for the same type of good. The bids comprise 
offers to buy or offers to sell. Each incoming bid is matched with the best possible order on the 
opposite market side. If the incoming bid matches an open offer on the other market side, the 
intermediary initiates the transaction, otherwise the bid is collected in the order book as open. In the 
case of Platform.com, all prospective market participants have access to the order book and can 
thereby evaluate the market situation. 
3.2 Descriptives 
Our study comprises transaction data between buyers and sellers on Platform.com and covers the 
period between April 2005 and May 2009. The prices range between 0.70 EUR and 4,199.00 EUR 
with a mean price of 106.18 EUR. Overall, 351 different sellers sold 25.677 unique products types (as 
identified by the unique EAN) in 78,068 transactions to 65,894 different buyers. 
As this numbers indicate, the retention rate for sellers is quite high while the retention rate for buyers 
is very low. Most buyers only buy one product on Platform.com which the intermediary certainly has 
to improve if it wants to capture a significant market share in the auction market. 
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Figure 1. Frequency of Transactions per Year, Month and Weekday 
  
Figure 1 indicates that the number of transactions grows over the years. In the first histogram, sales 
from 2005 and 2009 are projected for the entire years in order to compare the numbers with the period 
between 2006 and 2008. Thus, the numbers represent sales data from 12 months in every year. As the 
second histogram in Figure 1 shows, Platform.com benefits from a brisk Christmas trading period. The 
histogram at the right-hand side illustrates the sales over weekdays for all 78,068 transactions. 
Monday is the day of the week with the highest number of sales while Saturday is the day of the week 
with the lowest number of transactions.  
We also plot the frequency of sales for the days of the month (see Figure 2). We find that at the first 
days of the month the number of transactions increases. The number of sales then decreases until the 
25th of the month and then starts to increase again. Note that the number of transactions on the 29th, 
30th and 31st is biased downwards because not every month has a 31st day etc. Cash flows (wages, rent 
received etc.) typically occur at these days of the month while the account balance typically drops over 
the month. 
 
Figure 2. Frequency of Transactions per Day of the Month. 
The results presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicate that demand and supply fluctuate over time but 
these first results do not allow to draw conclusions about the efficiency of two-sided auction markets 
and this platform in particular. We therefore analyze the effect of calendar regularities on sales and 
price quantitatively in the next chapter. 
3.3 Analysis 
We start to analyze the effect of seasonality on daily sales and thus aggregate the transactions on a 
daily basis. We use dummy variables for weekdays (e.g. Monday = 1 indicates that the observation 
was made on Monday, 0 = otherwise), for months and for years to account for the development over 
time. Additionally, we introduce a dummy variable for public holidays (1 = for all public holidays in 
Germany, 0 = otherwise). We further create a dummy variable for the first five days and the last four 
days of each month and call the variable “Turn of the month”. We use Monday, December and the 
year 2009 as reference and thus estimated coefficients reflect changes in contrast to these reference 
points. 
  
To account for autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson statistic indicated the presence of autocorrelation in 
the residuals), we estimate a Prais-Winsten generalized least-squares regression, which assumes AR(1) 
error structures but no dynamics and which is equivalent to the use of full-information maximum 
likelihood for an AR(1) model. Additionally, we use robust standard errors to account for 
heteroskedasticity (White-Test p < 0.01). Table 1 shows the results of the Prais-Winsten regression 
with robust standard errors. The F-Test indicates that the model is valid and the transformed Durbin-
Watson statistic is also in a good range. The variance inflation factors (VIF) are below 4 (mean VIF = 
1.96) and thus multicollinearity does not seem to be a problem in the estimated model. The model 
estimated explains 24% of the variance and provides face validity. 
 
    Coef. Semirobust 
Std. Err. 
t P>|t| 
Constant (***) 209.80 21.52 9.75 0.00 
Turn of the Month -2.06 2.01 -1.02 0.31 
Tuesday (***) -5.46 1.19 -4.57 0.00 
Wednesday (***) -5.72 1.59 -3.61 0.00 
Thursday (***) -9.59 1.73 -5.55 0.00 
Friday (***) -14.26 1.83 -7.80 0.00 
Saturday (***) -23.68 1.92 -12.35 0.00 
Sunday (***) -13.55 1.78 -7.60 0.00 
Year2005 (***) -172.71 18.99 -9.09 0.00 
Year2006 (***) -152.73 18.03 -8.47 0.00 
Year2007 (***) -120.50 16.89 -7.14 0.00 
Year2008 (***) -38.85 15.55 -2.50 0.01 
January (***) -57.95 10.78 -5.37 0.00 
February (***) -59.64 12.01 -4.97 0.00 
March (***) -56.73 12.43 -4.56 0.00 
April (***) -57.83 12.97 -4.46 0.00 
May (***) -53.60 13.02 -4.12 0.00 
June (***) -47.34 12.76 -3.71 0.00 
July (***) -41.88 12.78 -3.28 0.00 
August (***) -49.10 14.22 -3.45 0.00 
September (*) -23.26 14.13 -1.65 0.10 
October (*) -20.65 12.56 -1.64 0.10 
November -14.38 11.48 -1.25 0.21 
Public Holiday (**) -4.21 2.05 -2.05 0.04 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; F = 14.65 (p<0.01); R² = 0.24  
Table 1.  The Effect of Seasonality on Number of Daily Sales  
 
We do not observe a significant effect of the turn of the month (p > 0.3) on sales on our examined 
auction platform. We do however observe that sales on all days of the week are significantly lower 
than on Mondays (p < 0.01). There are about 24 sales less on Saturdays than on Mondays. We also see 
significantly fewer sales in the years 2005-2008 than in 2009. The results further illustrate a strong 
seasonality over the year. In the first half of the year on average about 50 less sales occur per day 
while the model reveals a brisk Christmas trade period. In November and December sales peak out 
which also Figure 1 illustrated. On public holidays sales drop by about 4 (p<0.05). 
These figures confirm a strong seasonality and a periodic fluctuation of sales. The question however 
remains whether both market sides adapt in the same speed such that no price distortions occur. In a 
perfect market we should not observe persistent market anomalies. We will examine this interesting 
question in a next step and estimate a model with price as dependent variable. 
  
To make the observations comparable, we standardize the price of each observation by dividing by the 
mean price for this product. Again, we apply a Prais-Winsten generalized least-squares regression with 
robust standard errors and follow the same approach as outlined above. Table 2 depicts the results in 
detail. 
 
    Coef. Semirobust 
Std. Err. 
t P>|t| 
Constant (***) 0.976 0.002 601.58 0.00 
Turn of the Month (*) -0.001 0.001 -1.87 0.10 
Tuesday  0.001 0.001 1.22 0.22 
Wednesday  0.001 0.001 1.18 0.24 
Thursday  0.000 0.001 0.28 0.78 
Friday  0.001 0.001 0.82 0.41 
Saturday  -0.000 0.001 -0.09 0.93 
Sunday (**)  -0.003 0.001 -2.38 0.02 
Year2005 (***) 0.028 0.005 5.29 0.00 
Year2006 (***) 0.043 0.003 12.85 0.00 
Year2007 (***) 0.048 0.002 27.64 0.00 
Year2008 (***) 0.017 0.001 15.02 0.00 
January (***) 0.026 0.002 13.97 0.00 
February (***) 0.022 0.002 13.25 0.00 
March (***) 0.020 0.002 12.21 0.00 
April (***) 0.020 0.002 12.48 0.00 
May (***) 0.012 0.002 7.15 0.00 
June (***) 0.006 0.002 3.45 0.00 
July  0.001 0.002 0.71 0.48 
August (***) -0.005 0.001 -3.32 0.00 
September (***) -0.007 0.001 -4.45 0.00 
October (***) -0.008 0.001 -5.57 0.00 
November (***) -0.011 0.001 -8.61 0.00 
Public Holiday -0.001 0.002 -0.12 0.91 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; F = 88.16 (p<0.01); R² = 0.16  
Table 2. The Effect of Seasonality on Standardized Prices  
The F-Test statistic allows to reject the null hypothesis that the set of instruments are jointly zero, all 
VIFs are below 3 (mean VIF = 1.55), the model provides face validity, and explains 16% of the 
variance. The constant of 97.6% is highly significant. We observe that prices around the turn of the 
month are slightly (-0.1%, p < 0.1) lower than during the rest of the month which is a first evidence of 
market anomalies. We also observe that in the observation period of more than four years, prices are 
significantly lower on Sundays than on Mondays (p < 0.05). The same product generates on average 
0.3% less revenue on a Sunday than on the next day. According to the platform operator, the number 
of prospective buyers is lower on Sundays while most of the sellers keep their offer open for the 
weekend. This leads to a systematic excess supply. The incentive of 0.3% lower prices is however not 
enough to trigger a sufficient number of buyers to go online on Sundays which would close the gap in 
a perfect market. On average, the price discount on Sundays is about 0.32 EUR in absolute terms. The 
results also reveal that prices drop on average over time. This can be caused by dropping prices over 
time (e.g. pricing over normal life cycle) or a growing competition amongst sellers.   
Over the year, sellers can realize the highest price premium during the first half of the year. Prices are 
1-2% higher in this period than in December. This can result in savings of around 2.80 EUR for an 
average priced product. From a prospective buyer’s perspective, the best prices can be realized in 
November with a discount of 1.1% compared to December, or a discount of 3.7% when compared to 
January. This phenomenon is persistent and indicates that the market is either not informationally 
  
efficient or market participants behave strategically. Based on our input from management, we 
conjecture that the second alternative seems plausible. In the Christmas trade period a lot of sellers try 
to capture market share by acquiring buyers on the platform and turn them in loyal customers after this 
period of hard competition. 
4 Discussion 
Our analyses revealed that two-sided auction markets like Platform.com show the same properties as 
financial markets. Activity fluctuates over the week, over the year and over time. Interestingly, 
demand and supply increase/decrease quite simultaneously so that prices are rather constant over time. 
We however observe small market anomalies and persistent price distortions over time. Although we 
examined a period of more than four years, market participants can realize additional surpluses by 
shifting demand/supply to off-peak periods. We can predict that prices are on average lower on 
Sundays so that prospective buyers should move their demand to this day of the week. We also 
observe that there is a fierce competition among sellers before Christmas. Buyers can benefit from this 
competition. Product prices for the same product differ by 3.7% between November and January.  
From a tactical point of view, sellers should revisit their activities in the Christmas trade period as 
supply increases more than demand. Sellers can realize higher prices after Christmas. A price premium 
of 3-4% is huge, especially for low-margin consumer electronics that are mainly sold on 
Platform.com. However, our analysis does not consider strategic behaviour like the acquisition of new 
customers and the build-up of a long customer relationship. Selling on the platform in the Christmas 
trade period might lead to new customers with a high customer lifetime value. Therefore, the 
Christmas trade period might be considered as investment that will pay off in the long run. 
We also observe that price premiums decrease over time which indicates a growing competition and 
decreasing prices over the lifetime of the products. 
Although demand and supply fluctuates heavily over time (see Figure 1), prices stay relatively 
constant. We observe persistent price distortions over time but their magnitude is rather small in 
comparison to the fluctuation of sales. This clearly indicates that the market is rather efficient and 
supply follows demand and vice versa. This is especially interesting since Platform.com does not 
provide tools that allow analyses of historical data such that both market sides can suffer from 
incomplete information. Obviously market forces shift the market participants in the right direction 
and the market is thus quite efficient. The market anomalies are rather small in magnitude and would 
not allow to carry out arbitrage strategies. Based on our analyses, we can also conclude that 0.3% price 
discount is obviously not enough for some prospective buyers to go online on Sundays. The average 
saving of 0.38 EUR does not compensate the opportunity costs. 
4.1 Limitations and Future Research 
Our analysis is obviously restricted to the single case of Platform.com. The generalizability of our 
results must therefore be revalidated with data from additional two-sided auction platforms, e.g. eBay. 
With the access to the entire dataset of transactions conducted on Platform.com we are able to 
examine a very long period and a high number of products. This is certainly a unique selling 
proposition of this analysis. However, we did not separate pioneer buyers (2005-2006) from followers 
(2007-2009) so that our results might be influenced by changes in the customer population which 
would be an interesting avenue for future research.  
Based on the available data we can however not assess the intention of the market participants. Selling 
in the Christmas trade period might make sense in the long run although prices are systematically 
lower in this time of the year.  
  
Overall, there could be many reasons for differences in the demand. For instance, it is possible that 
people buy less on Sundays since they pursue their hobbies or spend time with their families. 
However, our data does not provide any further information about the buyers’ preferences which is 
why we can only speculate at this point. Future research might take these reasons for differences in the 
demand into account. 
We find that the magnitude of the market anomalies is rather small and it would be interesting to 
compare this magnitude of market anomalies to one-sided auction markets where auctioneer and seller 
are the same person. In the case of one-sided auction platforms, the seller could predict demand based 
on historical data as well as market research and would be able to perfectly adapt supply to the 
forecasted demand. This comparison would allow a more meaningful evaluation of the efficiency of 
two-sided markets where both market sides have only access to incomplete information. 
Our analysis does not incorporate competitive actions which is another limitation. We expect that data 
on exogenous events like marketing activities of other auction platforms would help to explain more 
variance. Overall, a more sophisticated model that also captures the diffusion and growth process of 
the platform as well as endogenous factors like investments in the functionality of the platform would 
help to explain a higher fraction of variance. We are however confident that our model does not 
systematically bias estimates and that our findings are robust. 
4.2 Conclusions 
While researchers in finance have intensively investigated the efficiency of financial markets, the 
efficiency of two-sided auction markets in Electronic Commerce still remains an open question. Our 
work contributes to research in this area by analyzing transaction data for a period of more than four 
years. We find that sales fluctuate heavily and follow a predictable pattern. The differences in sales are 
huge on the examined auction platform. The differences in prices are however small which indicates 
that supply and demand simultaneously increase and decrease. 
We observe however calendar related market anomalies that are persistent over time. Prices are lower 
on Sundays and on the turn of the month. These differences are small but significant and an evidence 
of market anomalies from an academic point of view.  
Prices change also over the months and provide practitioners to optimize their bidding and selling 
strategy. Buyers benefit from a brisk Christmas trade period with high competition while sellers can 
generate excess returns from focusing on the weeks after Christmas. 
We conclude that research on two-sided auction markets can further benefit from empirical analyses of 
transactional data. Unfortunately these data are not as publically available as data on financial markets. 
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